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Africa's trade is impeded by poor infrastructure. Inadequate transport infrastructure raises costs analogous to trade barriers, while inadequate
power discourages investment. Yet Africa's infrastructure needs greatly exceed its capacity to ﬁnance them. There is therefore a need, and an
opportunity, for substantial foreign private ﬁnance. However, to date, while private ﬁnance routinely ﬁnances infrastructure elsewhere in the world,
in Africa it has been very limited. This article sets out the chain of impediments to scaling up private ﬁnance and suggests ways of addressing them.
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International trade is highly dependent upon infrastructure.
Without it, private initiatives are constrained by their inability to
draw on essential contributions of transport, communications,
energy, and water services. They are held back by the absence of
the essential arteries through which the lifeblood of an economy
flows to the veins of the private sector.
Africa needs far more infrastructure than its governments can
afford to finance through tax or aid. Its infrastructure deficiency is
a major impediment to the expansion of exports. Yet, while the
region's infrastructure needs exceed its existing funding sources,
the costs are trivial relative to the size of world capital markets. The
inability of Africa to finance its infrastructure requirements is not
therefore a capacity constraint. It is an institutional and organiza-
tional one. As such it is therefore soluble but it needs an imaginative
approach which goes beyond what has been attempted to date.rofessor Colin Mayer for his substantial contributions
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rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).This article sets out the basis of conceiving a different
way of addressing Africa's infrastructure deficiency. It suggests
that it can be tackled through a combination of public and
private initiatives which address the public and private market
failures which have existed to date. Only once it is recognized
that both existing public and private sector arrangements are
deficient will it be appreciated that each party should cease
attributing blame to the other and instead recognize that it is in
the interests of both of them to work together in innovative
ways to combat the defects. If they do then the consequences
for the region's development will be profound.
1.1. The actors to date
To date there have been four key players in the provision of
infrastructure in Africa — governments, donors, private sector
institutions in OECD countries, and China. African governments
are very conscious that they need to attract private investment for
infrastructure. There has been a gradual process of recognition
that public monopolies have been dysfunctional, and the lobbies
that benefit from them have increasingly been on the defensive.
Usually, however, the desire for private financing has not advancedhts reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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ments have little capacity to design and present projects in detail
in a form that is financially attractive to investors. For example,
at the investor conferences at which African governments com-
monly pitch projects, the political risk of hold-up once the
investment has been made, which is probably the biggest single
impediment to private finance, is seldom acknowledged let alone
addressed.
Historically aid has been a major source of infrastructure
financing. However, over the past 15 years donors have switched
from infrastructure to social spending. The trend began during the
Wolfensohn presidency of the World Bank and reflected two
concerns. One was that the rise of private capital markets would
rapidlymake donor lending and grants for infrastructure irrelevant.
The other was that OECD tax payers were often ambivalent about
paying for modern infrastructure due to environmental and social
concerns; something most evident in respect of dams. There
was much stronger acceptance of expenditures that were directly
child focused, such as health and education. In attempting to
make infrastructure projects more acceptable to their critics,
agencies then encumbered themselves with a demanding range of
procedural checks which raised costs and slowed implementation.
A significant exception to this trend has been the establishment of
the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) by a
consortium of donors led by DFID, which we will discuss later.
The private sector in OECD countries has been disengaged
from investing in African infrastructure projects, perceiving
them as being a hassle to undertake, risky both financially and
in respect of reputation, and individually too small to warrant
the costs of developing the necessary skills to assess. This is
despite global capital markets being in a phase of exceptional
liquidity with the real interest rate on risk-free assets hovering
around zero. Large sums were directed to emerging market
economies, but little to Africa. In contrast to the zero real return
on safe OECD assets, the return required for private investment in
African infrastructure is very high. For example, InfraCoAfrica, a
PIDG-funded company which initiates infrastructure projects,
struggled to raise finance for a Ghanaian electricity project
despite a projected yield on equity of 20%. Since Ghana is rated
as one of the best-governed countries in Africa, this massive
wedge between the risk-free rate of interest acceptable to
financial markets, which is currently around zero, and the risk-
corrected rate demanded for African infrastructure, suggests that
managing risk is central to the provision of private finance. Nor is
this Ghanaian project in any way exceptional. A World Bank
analysis of the African electricity sector undertaken in 2011 found
that despite several attempts, virtually no privately financed
projects were actually operating.1 Up to 2011, new spending on
PPI in African power was averaging around $0.5bn per year,
against a target of $40bn.
China has filled the resulting vacuum through a distinctive
package in which infrastructure is financed and built in return for
rights to resource extraction. This offers speed and a full range of1 See Eberhard et al., (2011), and Eberhard et al., (2012).services inwhich the infrastructure is designed, built, financed and
transferred. It also provides a commitment technology whereby an
African government can lock into using natural asset depletion to
accumulate infrastructure, thereby avoiding pressures to dissipate
resource revenues in recurrent expenditure. However, the Chinese
proposals are often difficult to evaluate. They are opaque and so
are hard to price, and since China is a near monopolist in this type
of package they are not subject to direct comparison. Further,
Chinese projects are usually not well-integrated into larger devel-
opment strategies. A radical approach would be for the bilateral
OECD donors either to partner with Chinese approach, encour-
aging better integration into development planning, or to copy it,
using aid to catalyze a consortium of private firms. Several OECD
donors used towork in this way, and indeed China appears to have
modelled its approach on aid it received from Japan in the 1950s.
It would, however, require a cultural revolution in OECD aid
agencies and is probably not feasible let alone desirable.
1.2. If private finance for African infrastructure is a good idea
why hasn't it happened already?
Since private capital markets are designed to seek out attractive
opportunities to finance investment, a reasonable question is why,
if private capital should finance African infrastructure, has it
not happened already? Economics is rightly wary of arguments
that depend on sophisticated private financial actors making
prolonged and systematic errors.
A compelling response would be if the overall social return on
African infrastructure was inherently too low to warrant private
investment.2 In that case arguably investment in infrastructure
should not occur. We say arguably because a shortfall of social
returns below private required rates of return may also result from
private costs of capital being greater than their social equivalents,
i.e. the costs at which society as a whole, as against particular
private sector investors, would be willing to invest.
For the reasons mentioned at the beginning, it is unlikely
that the social returns to African infrastructure investment are
low. It is difficult to envisage Africa becoming a developed
region without substantially improved infrastructure. But it is
quite likely that the valuation of benefits by private investors
is substantially different for private investors from public insti-
tutions. There are two reasons for this. The first is the obvious
point that there are significant externalities associated with the
provision of infrastructure projects of which private investors
can only capture a small component. One only has to think of
the array of private sector enterprises which typically spring up
around major transportation hubs to appreciate the difference
between social and private rates of return.
Second, the risks and therefore costs of capital are funda-
mentally different between private and public sector providers.
Referring back to the arteries analogy used earlier, one piece of
infrastructure is inherently dependent on another— a bridge on
a road and the road on the bridge. In addition the profitability of2 In some African countries this is likely to be the case. See Collier, (2013).
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building of new ones in a neighbouring location— the problem
of the exposure of incumbents to the arrival of competing
providers.
It is therefore almost inevitably the case that social returns
on infrastructure exceed private returns and private costs of
capital exceed social ones with the implication that the private
sector fails to fund and initiate infrastructure projects which
from a social perspective should be undertaken.
Related to this is the problem of standardization. The
development of the mobile phone market in the US was held
back relative to that elsewhere in the world for many years by
a failure of providers to agree on common standards of inter-
connection. The effect of this is again to make private returns on
investment significantly below their social equivalents. Stan-
dardization is essential for reducing the information burden
associated with the implementation of idiosyncratic infrastructure
transactions. The scope for private actors to establish standard-
ization is further limited by the fact that one or more African
governments are necessarily parties to these transactions imply-
ing that only multinational public actors are likely to have the
perceived legitimacy.
While the public sector may have an advantage in the
provision of certain infrastructure activities, its deficiencies and
public sector failures have to be equally recognized. In particular,
their scope to impose risks on other parties through their powers
to confiscate, divert and expropriate anticipated returns are
legendary. A key step in making African infrastructure eligible
for OECD private finance is to de-risk it by restraining the ability
of governments to engage in such activities. This requires the
provision of commitment technologies which allow African
governments to tie themselves to their masts of self-restraint.
Without such commitment devices, promises of adequate returns
to private sector investment are simply not credible. Those
commitment devices will in general come from international
public agencies rather than private sector bodies whose powers of
enforcement over sovereign bodies are necessarily limited, but
regulators in OECD countries might also play a role in this.
As significant as commitment technologies is the proper
incorporation of infrastructure in public sector accounts. Deficits
are augmented by expenditure but, in the absence of a full set of
public sector balance sheets, the potential benefits of investments
are not correspondingly recognized. They therefore lead to dete-
riorations in public sector accounts and worsening in the terms
on which countries can raise finance externally. For spurious
accounting reasons, countries are therefore discouraged from
investing in infrastructure projects which augment their productive
potential. It is a problem that afflicts developed as well as
developing countries but it is particularly serious in the most
financially dependent economies.
One should not presume that the public sector failures are
restricted to host governments. Home country authorities are in-
evitably inclined to bind their private sector institutions excessively
to their masts. While the benefits of infrastructure investments are
enjoyed by host countries, the risks of widespread systemic failures
are borne by home countries. As a consequence, OECD countries
seek to protect their financial systems through regulation and in theprocess fail to reflect adequately the costs that they thereby impose
on host countries. The design of optimal regulation inevitably
involves trade-offs between multiple competing objectives, most
obviously between security and dynamism. In practice, these trade-
offs are navigated through the arguments of competing lobbies of
professionals within a country. However, where the benefits are
extra-territorial the normal procedures do not yield optimal
outcomes. At present an indirect consequence of OECD financial
regulations is that pension funds cannot hold African infrastructure
in their portfolios. Yet while Africa is disadvantaged by these
regulations, there has been no lobbying channel for their
reconsideration. In effect, there is a missing voice and OECD
development agencies need to provide it.
While the presence of any one of these private or public
failures might on its own be resolvable, the simultaneous
presence of all them means that each party — private sector
institution, host country, home country — perceive no way of
solving them on their own. Some coordinated initiative is
required to facilitate change and unblock the logjam.
An indication that such an initiative would be worth the effort
is that since 2011 the situation has started to change: private
finance for African infrastructure is no longer effectively stuck at
zero. For example, in South Africa the REEP program for
renewable energy has attracted committed financing of $11bn
while Nigeria and Kenya are on also track to attract significant
private finance for power. IPPs have been finalized, or are
coming to fruition, in 19 African countries. While this indicates
private appetite for African projects, public agencies are also
refocusing. For example, in 2013 sub-Saharan Africa was the
main client for IFC infrastructure projects, accounting for 30% of
the global total.
2. The problem
Once operating, infrastructure is not inherently a risky invest-
ment. In OECD countries investment in electricity generation and
water provision is classified as being in the utilities sector. Despite
the prospects of slow growth in the OECD, it is rated as a safe but
boring asset for a pension fund. However, in the process of
moving from developed to African economies, safe boring assets
morph into high risk, high required rate of return, ventures. For
example investment in electricity generation in Ghana, and a
fortiori in most of the rest of Africa, is classified not as a utility but
as a frontier market. Despite rapid growth of the economy, it is
regarded as unsuited to pension funds. This reflects a series of
differences between an electricity project in the OECD and in
Africa.
The Ghanaian project promoted by InfraCoAfrica took eight
years to prepare. That Ghana needed InfraCoAfrica is in itself a
symptom of a lack of capacity within African governments, at
both the civil service and political levels, to prepare projects at the
design stage to a standard appropriate for financial assessment.
Even with the InfraCoAfrica assistance the project took eight
years to bring to market, which is an indication of the multiple
political veto points that must be negotiated in order for a project
to be authorized. The combination of political complexity and the
lack of African public sector specialist teams able to prepare
40 P. Collier / Journal of African Trade 1 (2014) 37–44projects mean that there is no pipeline of projects ready for
funding.
The technical aspects of project preparation can be under-
taken by international consultancy companies, but they do not
have the political authority needed to overcome the spoiling
actions of veto players. The lack of a pipeline in turn means
that it is not worthwhile for either private investors or African
governments to finance specialist teams to undertake the design
work necessary to raise funding for construction. The prepa-
ration stage is open-ended and may lead nowhere, as indicated
by the failure of African electricity projects.
Further, as demonstrated by the Ghana case, once prepared
there may then be nomarket for the project. African infrastructure
projects are mostly small, specific and both costly to prepare and
hard to value. This reduces the size of the market for the assets
and makes them still harder to value. For example, the supporting
legal documentation for the off-take agreement in a recent
Kenyan electricity project was a thousand pages long resulting in
prohibitive legal costs.
Even if problems at the design stage can be overcome then
there is no certainty that the projects will get through the next
stage of finding investors. Organizations with risk capital, such as
investment banks, do not have the appetite for investments which
are replete with unquantifiable and uncontrollable risks, and long
gestation periods. They face the double jeopardy that if the project
fails there will be no one to bail it out and if it succeeds it is an
attractive deep pocket for cash strapped African governments.
Risks of expropriation reduce high social returns infrastructure to
uneconomic prospects and leave highly beneficial investments
unfunded.
If the returns are inadequate for a private investor why should
they be acceptable to a public agency? The most straightforward
answer is that private and public valuations of risks and returns
differ radically in low-income countries. Private investors have
the option of transferring their capital elsewhere and will do so if
they can thereby increase risk-adjusted returns. The public agency
has an entirely different objective, namely to accelerate the devel-
opment of the country. A project may be so risky as to be foolish
for a private investor, yet reduce the risk of state failure and so be
astute for a public agency.
Differences in valuation were the original rationale for
public risk capital agencies, such as CDC and IFC. However,
the activities of these agencies have seldom been integrated into
any larger development strategies. Aid and public risk capital
have been assigned by different and unconnected processes.
The difference in valuation implies that it is possible that
activities rejected by private financial actors might be sensible
for public agencies, but that does not in itself guide us to where
specific public interventions should occur. This is the question
to which we now turn.
3. The solutions
3.1. Specialist teams
One reason why the Ghana electricity project took eight
years is that African infrastructure projects are usually highlypolitical with multiple veto points. Catalyzing a project in such
an environment requires a combination of specialist technical
knowledge and high-calibre political entrepreneurship. While
the technical knowledge is readily available on the consultancy
market, the political entrepreneurship is rare. Conventional
private venture capital is unlikely to have this combination of
Africa-specific skills that can be redeployed between African
projects and other activities, and so the set-up costs are high and
the returns uncertain. Nor is it clear what the business model
can be that would enable such a team to generate a return if its
role is to catalyze the cooperation necessary for such a project
but not itself to own equity in it.
PIDG has established a publicly funded enterprise that directly
provides teams, but its staffing is essentially drawn from the
infrastructure industry rather than from political entrepreneurs. It
has yet to bring its projects to fruition. While the technical work
involved in project preparation is highly appropriate for aid
funding, the finance of political entrepreneurship is less evident. A
new company, BlackIvy, which combines political and technical
skills to catalyze large African infrastructure projects may be a
pioneer of what is needed. Its business model envisages a com-
bination of fees and a limited equity stake. It is too early to assess
its performance. Since it is difficult for African governments to
justify the decision to finance such entrepreneurial coordination, it
may be that PIDG is better-suited to provide the finance for them
rather than directly to try to provide the skills in-house. Donors are
understandably wary of spending aid on fees and have surrounded
decisions with procedures that sacrifice speed for defensibility but
this sits uncomfortably with the opportunistic nature of entrepre-
neurial activity.
3.2. Standardization
Idiosyncrasy is often a killer for markets because it inflates
the information cost of transactions. Private finance is beginning
to commit more resources to building a knowledge base on
Africa, but this usually remains rudimentary in comparison with
expertise on other regions. To accelerate the process whereby
private finance becomes comfortable with African investments
the information costs must be lowered. There are three solutions
to idiosyncrasy: standardization, insurance and bundling. By
means of standardization the information costs can be reduced
twice over. Most obviously, purchasers need a single effort to
understand a whole class of projects and so the cost can be spread
over the class rather than be individual to each project. More
subtly, in designing a standard it is worth investing in the costs of
achieving simplicity. Although ex post, simplicity by definition
requires little effort, ex ante it may appear difficult, as acknowl-
edged in the famous letter which ended ‘I apologize that this letter
is so long; I did not have the time to write a short one’. Radical
simplicity is attainable: for example, in contrast to that 1000 page
Kenyan agreement, an Indian off-take agreement for electricity
was only around 20 pages long.
Markets are bad at self-generating standardization. Even
simple standards such as weights and measures have invariably
been supplied by governments as public goods. That a standard
contract which would be suitable for many low-income countries
3 An important issue that we do not consider here is the opportunity to make
mine-related infrastructure multi-user and multi-function (see Collier, 2011).
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economic governance: no authority has yet been able to play the
coordinating role. Partnerships UK attempted this role in Africa
and had a memorandum of understanding with IFC, but the
attempt to bring a British template to Africa failed, in part because
there were too few potential projects for standardization to be
meaningful. However, now that there is a surge of interest in
projects, there may be a genuine opportunity.
Together the provision of specialist teams and standardiza-
tion address the supply of projects to a pipeline. They do not,
however, address the risk of the project. To make the risk
acceptable, it can be insured, repackaged and lowered.
3.3. Insurance
MIGA, theWorld Bank's insurance arm, is small, and until very
recently largely avoided Africa. As with IFC, it has not been
strategically integrated into World Bank operations. Typically, if
MIGA is willing to insure a particular African infrastructure
project, it will charge around 1% per year to cover a range of
political risks. MIGA's operations in Africa need to be scaled up
and for this it needs more public capital. Further, if the infra-
structure project is strategic, covering the cost of the insurance
premium should be regarded as a legitimate use of IDA: currently
there is no mechanism for a country's IDA allocation to be used in
this way.
Political risk insurance is not the only need. Revenue streams
from projects are in local currency, whereas investors function in
foreign currency. Hence, there is a need for currency hedges. Often
African financial markets lack the efficiency and depth to provide
currency hedges beyond the short term at reasonable rates. PIDG
has recognized this need by establishing a company to provide
currency hedges for infrastructure, GuarantCo Ltd Infrastructure.
3.4. Bundling
To the extent that risks cannot be further insured, they can be
re-bundled so that investors with a low risk threshold are able to
accept the low-risk component on a project without having to
take on risks which are unacceptable. Over the lifetime of a
project, from design through construction to operation, the risks
change considerably. Once the project is operating it becomes a
utility with relatively low and clear risks, whereas up to that point
it faces substantial uncertainties. This suggests that if pension
fund money is to be attracted into African infrastructure it would
be appropriate to split the project up into two or three stages. The
catalytic design stage might be funded by either public capital or
private venture capital. The project construction phase, during
which large irreversible investment is committed, is likely to
require a combination of equity and bond finance. It may be
particularly suited to public agencies. The project operation
phase, which may last for decades, is lower risk, and should in
principle be appropriate for OECD pension funds.
Having un-bundled individual infrastructure projects accord-
ing to their phasing, a further step in de-risking would be to re-
bundle them into a fund which would hold them together with
other infrastructure projects from emerging market and OECDcontexts. This would both diversify individual country risk and
dilute the high-risk projects. Such a bundling approach has
already been demonstrated to work by the Bank for International
Settlements in respect of East Asian sovereign debt. Following
the East Asian Crisis, the sovereign bonds of Indonesia and the
Philippines were rated at sub-investment grade, but, by placing
them within a sovereign bond fund which predominantly held
bonds from countries which were investment grade, the fund
received an investment grade and thereby channelled money into
sub-investment grade assets.
A good way of getting such a fund started would be for the
public agencies that already provide risk capital for infrastructure,
such as IFC, FMO and CDC, to divest themselves of their existing
portfolio of completed, operational infrastructure projects. Not only
would this enable a fund to hold a range of projects from the start,
but it would inject liquidity into the agencies needed for the role in
which they are irreplaceable, of funding the construction phase.
Standardization, insurance and bundling are traditional forms
in which risks are spread and offset in financial markets. In the
case of African infrastructure, countries can in addition play an
important role themselves in reducing risks.3.5. Commitment technologies
The riskiness of African infrastructure projects is predominantly
political. This is especially the case now that the conventional
commercial risks have been reduced by rapid economic growth.
The political risks are seen as substantial because governments
have exceptionally strong opportunities for hold-up. By its nature
infrastructure is irreversible and single function. Its construction is
often intrusive on the local environment and so provokes oppo-
sition. The services are often provided through a network, so that
there are inherent issues of monopoly, network access, and hence
regulation. If these discretionary regulatory powers are assigned
domestically in a corrupt environment, there is a reasonable pre-
sumption of corruption. The services that infrastructure provides
are often politically sensitive because citizens perceive the govern-
ment as having some obligation for them. Further, the government
will sometimes be a customer for these services.
Infrastructure is long-lasting and so the horizon for govern-
ment interference extends far into the future. Since not all issues
can be fully anticipated in sufficient detail, contracts will
inherently be incomplete and so subject to subsequent negotia-
tion. The risks of infrastructure can be compared and contrasted
with those of investing in mining. Like infrastructure, a mine is
disruptive to the local environment and so provokes opposition,
and it is long-lasting, irreversible and single-function. However,
the output of the mine is sold neither to government, nor to the
population, and so the scope for hold-up is considerably reduced.
In the past decade, in contrast to infrastructure, African mining
has been able to attract considerable private finance. Infrastruc-
ture for mining has proved more problematic, as implied by the
above comparison.3
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reduce them through commitment technologies. Some commit-
ment technologies do not need public intervention. Dispute
Resolution Boards are purely private processes that can be
agreed between African governments and the private contractor.
However, African governments are often wary of this loss of
sovereignty. A more widely accepted form of commitment
technology is implicit in the political risk insurance provided by
theWorld Bank and the USGovernment: MIGA and OPIC. Each
agency is able to offer political risk insurance cheaply because,
through the implied power of the World Bank and the US
Government respectively, they are able to recover from govern-
ments most of what they have to pay out to insured investors. In
effect, by permitting investors to insure with MIGA and OPIC,
governments are subjecting themselves to a publicly provided
commitment technology in which the implicit threat of deteri-
orating relations provides credibility.
There may be potential for other implicit publicly-provided
commitment technologies. For example, a standardization pack-
age such as one the African Development Bank might promote
could include a guideline timetable for setting deadlines. Dead-
lines, if credible, are useful devices for coordinating action, and a
neutrally provided standard timetable might make it easier both to
get agreement on them and to enforce them.3.6. Utility operators
Whether the operation phase of a project is low risk depends
primarily upon whether it is well-run. This requires a reputable
specialist private operator. In the OECD there are now major
companies dedicated to running infrastructure — power com-
panies, rail companies, port companies, airport companies etc.
To date, these companies have seldom ventured into Africa
but it is a potential market for expansion of their business. To
an extent, their reluctance may reflect their OECD-focused
corporate cultures: the OECD infrastructure companies grew
out of domestic privatisations. Even in respect of telecoms they
were late into the African market: Mo Ibrahim only founded
Celtel, his spectacularly successful African company, after failing
to persuade established OECD companies to enter the African
market. Despite not being African, OECD infrastructure compa-
nies offer several advantages for African governments. They have
built the specialist teams and organizational structures needed for
good performance, and having established reputations, they have
a stronger incentive to perform.
Potentially, OECD infrastructure companies could not only
operate African infrastructure but finance it on their core balance
sheets, subsuming it into their other projects just as an inter-
national oil company treats its African projects as financially
integral rather than being run a separately financed subsidiary.
However, because of the high fixed costs of entry, companies
may be unable to diversity uncorrelated political risks across
countries leaving them exposed to the idiosyncratic conduct of
particular governments. For such diversification the project-
specific risks need to be re-bundled as discussed above thereby
allowing OECD infrastructure companies which do not wish toretain African projects in their core portfolios to sell them on to
infrastructure funds while retaining management contracts.
3.7. Financial regulation
The next hurdle facing the private financing of African
infrastructure is the behaviour of pension funds. Currently,
OECD pension funds are required by law to hold assets of at
least A− quality. African infrastructure projects are far below this
threshold and there is no realistic prospect of getting them to A−.
The move to risk-weighting of capital ratios further disadvan-
tages those assets perceived as high-risk. This is why diluting the
risk of African infrastructure projects through bundling them in
with lower risk projects might be particularly useful.
One possible deficiency in financial regulation is that pension
funds tend to equate safety with liquidity. Since pension funds
have well-defined future obligations, the comprehensive liquidity
of assets should be irrelevant to their concerns. Pension funds are
currently facing a crisis not because their assets have become
illiquid, but because the yield on them has substantially declined.
By sacrificing some liquidity for higher yield, pension funds
could reduce the risk that they will be unable to meet their
liabilities. Hence, regulations which equate safety with liquidity
might not only be damaging for Africa but also counterproductive
for their core objective.
A further possible deficiency is a consequence of the fact that
financial regulations give legal force to the assessments of com-
mercial risk-rating agencies which are not publicly accountable. A
rule adopted by the rating agencies, which is of considerable
importance for African infrastructure, is that an African project
cannot be rated more highly than the sovereign debt of the
country. The rating agencies do not adopt such a rule for OECD
countries: there, projects can be rated more highly than national
debt (Greece is a case in point where Goldman Sachs famously
encouraged the government to raise funds by securitizing in-
frastructure projects). The rationale for applying this rule to Africa
but not to the OECD appears questionable. For example, during
the past decade when the government of Cote d'Ivoire suspended
its debt service, projects maintained payments to bondholders.
More generally, the structure of risks differs between sovereign
debt and infrastructure. With sovereign debt the collateral is
the revenue stream from the tax base, but this is subject to
possible pre-emption by public spending. With an infrastruc-
ture project, the revenue stream is project-specific, but this
cannot be pre-empted by other claims. A more limited revenue
stream is compensated by stronger rights.
The rating ceiling is important because there is a lot of
inertia in bond ratings. Lacking a track record of public debt
service, even though African governments are currently able to
borrow cheaply on sovereign debt markets, their new bonds are
not highly-rated by the agencies. Nor, given their record, can
the rating agencies make strong claims for specialist knowl-
edge. It is questionable whether OECD financial regulators are
even aware that they are giving legal force to this questionable
ceiling, yet it closes off the chance of creating ring-fenced
collateral that can leapfrog the slow process of sovereign bond
re-rating.
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Governments are not the only agents that impose risks on
investors in infrastructure projects. Since infrastructure has fea-
tures of local if not national monopolies associated with it, it is in
general subject to regulation which determines the charges that
can be levied on customers and the requirements on operators to
maintain and enhance the fabric of the infrastructure over its life.
Regulation sets obligations on utilities to supply disadvantaged
customers and those living in remote rural areas, and requires
environmental and quality of service standards to be satisfied.
In the absence of such regulation, utility companies might be
able to impose excessive and unfair charges, cherry pick their
most profitable customers, and degrade both the infrastructure
and the environment.
Regulation is therefore essential for infrastructure provision
to be politically acceptable but, in so doing, it shifts the burden
of risks onto the utility companies by making them potentially
exposed to regulatory interventions that extinguish their ability
to recover the costs of their investments. Regulation therefore
has to play an astute role in avoiding exploitation of vulnerable
customers, communities or investors. It is a function which
requires a considerable degree of expertise and experience and
it has taken regulatory organizations many years to acquire this
knowledge in OECD economies. The absence of the necessary
skills could potentially undermine the emergence of infrastruc-
ture investment and utility company operations in Africa.
One approach that can be taken to address this is to draw on
the knowledge and experience that regulators in OECD have
acquired by encouraging them to advise on, oversee or actually
undertake the regulation of infrastructure projects in Africa.
This would provide precisely the type of independent and in-
formed oversight of infrastructure activities associated with
the commitment technologies described above. The ability to
export their expertise might be attractive to OECD regulators
seeking to benefit from the expertise that they have acquired
domestically.
3.9. Interdependence of activities
The analogy with the arteries of the body at the start of the
article suggests that infrastructure projects are rarely standalone
activities. They interact with each other and with other parts of the
economy in a network form.While conceptualizing infrastructure
projects at the design stage involves establishing a case for them
in their own right, they have to be considered in the context of
broader local, national and social objectives. They should there-
fore be conceived of in their entirety as part of broader devel-
opment strategies that promote private sector investments as well
as social objectives.
Achievement of this requires proper evaluation and account-
ing for the benefits as well as the costs of infrastructure. Public
accounts rarely show balance sheets that incorporate infrastruc-
ture assets as well as liabilities. Instead, these exercises are
performed as separate cost benefit analyses that are not reflected
in national accounts. The design and planning of infrastructure
should be undertaken in the round with proper valuationsattributed to assets as well as liabilities that in turn flow through
countries' national accounts.
The expertise to do this exists at the level of national and
international bodies most notably the OECD and the World
Bank. These organizations should be focusing their attention not
on the funding of individual infrastructure projects but on
assisting countries with developing the tools to provide accurate
evaluations of the effects of infrastructure on national welfare.
Included in this should not just be the financial benefits and costs
but also the consequences of infrastructure development for
environmental, human, natural and social capital.
3.10. Interdependence of solutions
The above has set out a long chain of deficiencies which
between them account for why African infrastructure projects
with high potential returns cannot attract private finance. Were
there only one of these deficiencies there would be a strong
market incentive to provide it since in matching finance in search
of yield with high-yield assets in search of finance, big profits
could be made. The over-arching problem is that there are
multiple critical deficiencies which would need to be supplied by
distinct classes of actor. When there is interdependence between
multiple missing classes of actor, private markets do not transmit
signals to respond to needs.
Without the chain of activities necessary for a pipeline of
projects, there is no incentive to fix the impediments required to
sell completed projects to pension funds. Restating this in
reverse, the only actors with an incentive to recognize and
respond to this strategic interdependence are the development
agencies.
4. Conclusion
The expansion of African exports will need radical improve-
ments in the region's infrastructure. The scale of finance
required implies that international private capital will need to be
attracted into the sector. Public agencies such as IFC, MIGA
and PIDG already deploy public money to encourage private
investment. However, unless agencies use their role strategi-
cally, they merely out-compete private agencies in transactions
that would have been done anyway. This is indeed the standard
private sector critique of their current behaviour. To the extent
that they are staffed largely with expertise drawn from the
private sector with which they compete, this outcome is all too
likely.
This article has suggested a range of strategic uses of public
money. To generate a pipeline of bankable projects there is a need
for catalytic finance for specialist teams equipped not just with
technicians but with political entrepreneurs who can overcome
veto players. A further range of public interventions can help to
de-risk projects: standardization, subsidized risk insurance,
re-bundling, commitment devices and appropriate accounting.
Financial regulation needs to be revised to remove rules which
prevent pension funds from holding African infrastructure with-
out making them safer and utility regulation could be imported
from overseas to provide the form of regulatory certainty required
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ers and communities. Once these obstacles are overcome by
public action, the one remaining missing piece — OECD utility
operators — will be resolved without further public action as a
result of the changed commercial incentives.
Several donors now recognize the case for using public funds
to catalyze private finance for African infrastructure. DFID
promoted a multi-donor fund, PIDG, of which it remains by far
the largest funder. It also recently reformed CDC, giving it a
more development-focused purpose. During 2013 there have
been several further initiatives. The African Development Bank
announced its intention to launch an Africa50 Fund to raise
private finance for infrastructure. The US Government launched
a PowerAfrica initiative. The World Bank has recently quadru-
pled its MIGA portfolio in Africa, and announced that it will
make IFC more strategic, for the first time creating an economic
advisory board. The BRICS announced a plan to establish a
development bank for infrastructure. The G8 communiqueincluded a specific commitment to the objective with delivery in
2015; the G20 has a corresponding objective.
However, while these initiatives are encouraging, there is a
danger that the public agencies will respond with a plethora of
small, uncoordinated and incomplete initiatives. The challenge
is for an organizational design that can rapidly scale up to
match Africa's infrastructure needs.
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